Whole Business Securitization in Emerging Markets by Hill, Claire A.
HILL ARTICLE_FMT.DOC 06/12/02 1:48 PM
521
WHOLE BUSINESS SECURITIZATION
IN EMERGING MARKETS
CLAIRE A. HILL*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Whole business securitization, a transaction structure developed
in England, has been used in Malaysia and is being considered for use
in Hong Kong and Singapore.1  How does the structure add value?
The answer is not obvious.  Whole business securitization is, as the
name implies, securitization of the whole business.  Why are the
structuring expenditures over and above those that would be incurred
in a simpler debt and equity structure worthwhile?  How does the
firm become more valuable when it is placed into a securitization
structure?  In a typical securitization, a pool of like receivables is se-
curitized.  There is at least the promise of economies of appraisal and
management.  Explaining why placing a whole business—not only the
firm’s receivables, but also its plant, property and equipment, intellec-
tual property, and all of its other assets—into a securitization struc-
ture adds value is, at first blush, a daunting challenge.
In this essay, I propose an explanation.  Whole business securiti-
zation adds value by minimizing bankruptcy costs.  A group of credi-
tors provides the firm’s entire debt funding; the group agrees, at the
time the financing is provided, on their respective rights and obliga-
Copyright © 2002 by Claire A. Hill
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1. See Chito Santiago, Operating Company Securitization in Malaysia, THE ASSET
ONLINE, July 2001, at http://www.theassetonline.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2002); Whole-
Business Securitization, LEGAL MEDIA GROUP, July 31, 2001 (originally published in INT’L
SECURITIZATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE REPORT) (quoting a Hong Kong attorney for a
large U.S. firm who advised on the 1st Silicon Inc. deal: “There have been a number of inquiries
from originators in different countries to structure whole-business deals to fit into various
bankruptcy and insolvency regimes.  Particularly those countries whose legal systems are based
on common law, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong.”), at http://www.gtnews.com/
articles_se/3414.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2002); Seeds of Securitization Emerging in Asia This
Year, with Malaysia, Philippines, and Taiwan at the Forefront, ASSET SECURITIZATION
REPORT, Feb. 26, 2001, at 13, 13, available at http://www.absnet.net (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
HILL ARTICLE_FMT.DOC 06/12/02  1:48 PM
522 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 12:521
tions should the firm encounter financial difficulties.  The transaction
structure effectively includes an intercreditor agreement governing
the relationship of all of the firm’s creditors.  The squabbling on the
eve of bankruptcy that bankruptcy systems seek to prevent occurs
well beforehand, when parties’ incentives are not as opposed as they
become when the firm faces, or is in, bankruptcy.
The whole business transaction structure is only possible in juris-
dictions in which secured creditor priority is respected absolutely.
The jurisdictions at issue are the United Kingdom and emerging mar-
kets such as Singapore and Malaysia, which inherited bankruptcy sys-
tems from the United Kingdom.2  In such jurisdictions, a secured
creditor of all or substantially all of the assets of a company can con-
trol the company’s insolvency.3  The secured creditors thus have the
ability and incentive to formulate, at the outset of their financing, an
effective intercreditor agreement that will be respected should their
debtor become bankrupt.
2. Secured creditor priority is not sufficiently respected in the United States to permit
whole business securitization.  See Marion Leblanc-Wohrer, Growing Success for Whole Busi-
ness Securitization, ASSET SECURITIZATION REPORT, Feb. 19, 2001, at 18, 18, available at
http://www.absnet.net (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
In continental Europe and the US, the legal framework protects the debtor.  Chapter
11 of the US Bankruptcy Code render [sic] traditional security arrangements by an
originator nearly useless for the purposes of timely payment of interest and principal
required by capital markets investors for highly rated securities.  After the bankruptcy
of the originator, the federal court has extensive powers to delay the creditors’ rights
to access their security.
Id.  Bankruptcy lawyers routinely complain that violations of absolute priority are common-
place.  As Douglas Baird notes, while “[t]he absolute priority rule allows the senior parties to
insist on full payment, it also grants all junior parties those procedural protections necessary for
a ‘just reorganization.’”  DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 77 (3d ed. 2001)
(characterizing these protections as “elaborate”).
3. The Insolvency Act of 1986 is the relevant U.K. law.  A secured creditor with charges
over all or substantially all of the debtor’s assets is allowed to appoint an administrative re-
ceiver.  Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 29 (Eng.).  The administrative receiver then manages and
controls the company’s assets; the main purpose of the receiver is to run the company for the
benefit of the secured creditor (i.e., satisfy the debt owed to the secured creditor).  See Ebo
Coleman & Stephen Roughton-Smith, Special Report: Non-Bankruptcy-Remote Issuers in Asset
Securitisation, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, Mar. 22, 2001, at 3, 6–7.  That being said, certain
“preferential debts”—in particular, certain taxes, social security, and pension fund contribu-
tions—have priority over amounts owing to secured creditors.  Insolvency Act, 1986, c.45, §§ 40,
386 (Eng.).  Interestingly, the United Kingdom is considering paring back administrative receiv-
ership, and thereby scaling back the rights of secured creditors.  See DEPT. OF TRADE & IND.,
INSOLVENCY—A SECOND CHANCE (Cm. 5234, 2001), available at http://www.insolvency.
gov.uk/cwp/cm5234.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2002); see also Mairin Burns, UK Insolvency Re-
form on the Way: Secured creditors’ control to ebb under new rules, INVESTMENT DEALER’S
DIGEST, Aug. 6, 2001, at 12, 12–13.
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In sum, whole business securitization offers a combination of
economies: economies of scale and scope, and transaction costs sav-
ings of various types.  Some of the economies are those frequently
discussed in the literature but available in different ways.4  Other,
more novel economies are made possible by features of the legal re-
gimes in countries with English-style systems, features not contained
in the U.S. legal system.
II.  BRIEF HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF SECURITIZATION
Securitization was developed in the United States in the 1970s.
The structure contemplates the creation of a pool of cash flows; inter-
ests in the pool are sold to investors, and the proceeds are paid to the
entity originating the cash flows.  The first type of securitization
transaction involved mortgages originated by banks.  Since then,
many other types of cash flows have been securitized,5 and transaction
volume is now sizeable.6  Europe began using securitization in the
1980s, and it now has a sizeable transaction volume as well.7
In the late 1980s, emerging markets began using securitization.
The first transaction was done by the Mexican telephone company
TelMex.  TelMex securitized its rights to receive payments from
AT&T for the Mexican portion of telephone calls made to Mexico
from the United States—that is, the portion taking place between the
United States-Mexico border and the Mexican destination.  In the se-
curitization transaction, TelMex sold its rights to the payments from
AT&T to a pool; the pool sold interests in the payments to investors,
and paid to TelMex the amount it received from the investors.8  As
4. See discussion infra Section IV.
5. See generally Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996) (providing an overview of securitization transactions and relevant
benefits).
6. 2001 was a stellar year for the U.S. asset-backed securitization market, with a record
$350 billion issued in asset-backed securities alone.  Plain Vanilla Tastes Good: Ford’s $5 billion
ABS deal sets the pace in a strong market, INVESTMENT DEALER’S DIGEST, Jan. 7, 2002, at 46,
46.  Mortgage securitization volume will add significantly to the total.
7. As of June 2001, asset-backed security issues in Europe already totaled over $52 billion
(excluding commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) and collateralized bond obligation
(CBO) deals).  ABS Issued Outside of the US, ASSET-BACKED ALERT, June 30, 2001, available
at http://www.abalert.com/Public/MarketPlace/Ranking (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
8. Claire A. Hill, Latin American Securitization: The Case of the Disappearing Political
Risk, 38 VA. INT’L L.J. 293, 307–08 (1998).
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happened in the United States, subsequent securitization transactions
have involved many different types of cash flows.9
III.  DESCRIPTION OF WHOLE BUSINESS SECURITIZATION
The whole business securitization structure first emerged with
the securitization of nursing homes in the United Kingdom in the
mid-1990s.10  Since then, there have been several transactions in the
United Kingdom,11 a few in Australia12 and New Zealand,13 and now
one transaction in Malaysia.14  Investment bankers hope that as finan-
cial markets become familiar with the structure, whole business secu-
ritization will increasingly be a financing option for suitable compa-
nies.  One banker at Nomura, the bank that arranged the Malaysian
deal, said “we’ve broken ground in Asia, and have lawyers and inter-
national rating agencies on board in structuring this kind of a deal.”15
And Vinod Kothari, a leading expert on securitization in emerging
markets, said that the Malaysian transaction “will act as a notable
precedent for similar issues in Asia.”16
A. Whole Business Securitization
The salient features of whole business securitization are as fol-
lows.  A special purpose vehicle (SPV) is formed to make a loan to a
9. See generally id. (describing the successful introduction of securitization in Latin
America).
10. Nursing Homes Securitization Gathers Steam in the UK, INVESTMENT DEALER’S
DIGEST, Dec. 8, 1997, at 6, 6 (discussing nursing home securitization deals that focused on the
collateralization of future lease and rent payments).
11. U.K. transactions have involved the London City Airport, Madame Tussaud’s Wax
Museum, and pubs and taverns.  See This year’s model, PROJECT FIN., Mar. 1, 2000, at 32, 32–33;
Conor Downey, Whole Business Securitization Comes of Age, INT’L FIN. L.R., Sept. 1999, at 8,
8–12; Leblanc-Wohrer, supra note 2, at 18.
12. For example, one transaction involved “notes . . . backed by a pool of fixed-rate . . .
lease contracts with underlying collateral of equipment and” automobiles.  Luke Elder,
Commentary: Securitization of Operating Assets in Australia and New Zealand, STANDARD &
POOR’S, July 2, 2001, at http://www.standardandpoors.com/australiaNZ/forum/marketcommen-
tary/articles/070301_secassets.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
13. One transaction in New Zealand involved notes backed by a pool of commercial fixed
rate operating lease contracts with underlying collateral of passenger vehicles, utilities, and light
trucks.  See id.
14. See infra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
15. See Santiago, supra note 1, at 4.
16. Rob Davies, Leading Indian Expert Advocates ABS in Asia, FINANCEASIA.COM, Nov.
27, 2001, at http://www.financeasia.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).  Note, too, that Moody’s ex-
pects whole business securitization to be an important part of the European securitization mar-
ket.  Moody’s: Global ABS Issuance to Remain Strong in 2002, Despite Credit Crunch, MOODY’S
INVESTORS SERVICE, Feb. 8, 2002.
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company that is seeking financing (the borrower).  The SPV makes
the loan, using money it raises from investors.  It receives as security
for repayment of the loan fixed and floating charges over all or sub-
stantially all of the borrower’s assets, and thus becomes a secured
creditor of the borrower.  Under the bankruptcy laws of the United
Kingdom and other jurisdictions that have used this transaction struc-
ture, secured creditors of a company approaching insolvency can ap-
point a receiver who controls and manages the company purely for
the creditors’ benefit.17  The absolute priority granted to holders of
the fixed and floating charges to appoint an administrative receiver is
respected absolutely, unlike in the United States, where absolute pri-
ority is routinely violated.18
The SPV has a security trustee who acts on behalf of the inves-
tors.  Should the borrower become bankrupt, the trustee has exten-
sive powers.19  Indeed, in some cases, alternate uses for the company’s
assets have already been considered and strategies to explore those
uses have been included in the transaction documentation.20
Other features of the whole business securitization transaction
structure are typical securitization features, such as liquidity facilities
and other types of credit enhancement.  Interestingly, while standard
securitizations are very often done using multiple tranches, wherein
some investors are paid first and others are paid afterwards, whole
business securitizations sometimes are done using only one tranche,
especially where the transaction size is small.21
Although the whole business transaction structure is nominally a
securitization, it is actually a hybrid between a true securitization and
17. See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 32 (Eng.).
18. See, e.g., id.; Coleman & Roughton-Smith, supra note 3, at 6–7.  Cf. BAIRD, supra note
2, at 74–78.
19. For a general discussion of trustees in securitization, see HILL, supra note 5, at 1098–99.
20. See generally Benedict Pfister, Special Report: Whole Business Securitizations: A
Unique Opportunity for UK Assets, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, Oct. 19, 2000 (discussing
how the ability to use a business’s assets in a different capacity allows a delinkage between the
securitized debt and the borrower’s industry or business (e.g., nursing homes or pubs may be
converted into residential properties or general retail use) resulting in a more highly rated is-
sue).
21. The 1st Silicon transaction, see discussion infra Part III.B, has only one tranche, as does
the City Aviation Finance Limited transaction, see This year’s model, supra note 11, but the
Really Useful Theatres Limited Asset Backed Notes transaction, see Sunil Gidoomal & Charles
Gamm, Pre-Sale Report: Really Useful Theatres Finance Limited Asset Backed Notes, MOODY’S
INVESTORS SERVICE, Oct. 16, 2000, at 1, had four tranches, as did the Tussaud Group transac-
tion.  Downey, supra note 11, at 9.  And the Punch Funding II transaction had six tranches.  See
Benedict Pfister, Pre-Sale Report: Punch Funding II Limited, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE,
May 24, 2000.
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a corporate credit.22  Insofar as it depends on the continued cash-
generating abilities of the operating company, it resembles a corpo-
rate credit. It also somewhat resembles future flows securitization,
which, as the term implies, securitizes cash flows that will be gener-
ated in the future.  The more typical securitizations securitize existing
flows, flows already owing at the time they are securitized.
Many types of businesses are unsuitable for whole business secu-
ritization.23  A good candidate is a stable business with a long operat-
ing history, fairly predictable cash flows, and managers who are not
indispensable.24  Furthermore, the company cannot need regular infu-
sions of additional financing; it scarcely seems worthwhile to, in ef-
fect, negotiate an elaborate intercreditor agreement among the com-
pany’s creditors and then have to seek new financing from others not
party to the agreement.25
B. Malaysian Whole Business Securitization
The Malaysian whole business securitization transaction, 1st Sili-
con (Labuan) Inc., was completed in June 2001.26  The borrower in
the transaction, 1st Silicon (Malaysia) Sdn., established Malaysia’s
first 200mm silicon wafer fabrication plant.  (Silicon wafers are sold to
the semiconductor industry.)  The investors, who purchased notes
from the SPV, received the benefit of fixed and floating charges over
all of the borrower’s assets.27
This transaction violates some of the above-mentioned guide-
lines for whole business transactions.  The borrower is a start-up
company, not presently generating much cash flow.  Furthermore, the
semiconductor industry itself is volatile; the borrower may have diffi-
culty achieving stable and predictable cash flows.28  What made the
transaction possible was a guarantee from the Sarawak Economic
Development Corp. and a letter of support from the State Govern-
22. See generally Elena Folkerts-Landau, Commentary: Principles for Analyzing Structured
Finance/Corporate Hybrid Transactions, STANDARD AND POOR’S, July 2, 2001 (describing the
principles developed by Standard and Poor’s for rating structured finance/corporate hybrid
transactions), at http://www.standardandpoors.com/emarketing/structuredfinance/copy070201_
hybrid.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
23. See Leblanc-Wohrer, supra note 2, at 1.
24. Folkerts-Landau, supra note 22, at 6.
25. Id.
26. Santiago, supra note 1, at 1.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 3; Neal Shah & Stephen Roughton-Smith, Pre-Sale Report: 1st Silicon (Labuan)
Inc., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, May 25, 2001, at 2.
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ment of Sarawak.29  Because of the guarantee and letter of support,
the transaction was able to obtain an investment grade rating, the first
Malaysian corporate bond issue to do so without an “explicit link” to
the Malaysian sovereign.30
IV.  CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORY: HOW DOES WHOLE
BUSINESS SECURITIZATION ADD VALUE?
The starting point for inquiries into transaction structures is
Modigliani and Miller’s capital structure irrelevance theorem.31  The
theorem shows that in a perfect world with no transaction or agency
costs, a firm’s capital structure (and, by extension, the transaction
structures it uses to effectuate that capital structure) cannot add
value.32  The task is to identify the costs that a particular transaction
structure helps reduce.33  Among the types of benefits commonly as-
cribed to transactions are information cost, transaction cost, or
agency cost benefits.  For instance, a transaction structure might allo-
cate duties to economize on, and take advantage of, specialization in
monitoring.34  Or the structure might constrain a firm so as to act in
creditors’ interests in certain respects, thus lowering their discount for
the firm’s potential misbehavior.
An explanation I have given for securitization is that it can re-
duce overall information costs to the firm’s investors.  Securitization
29. Because of this sub-sovereign bond transaction element, the transaction could further
be classified as a triple hybrid.  Santiago, supra note 1, at 3.
30. Nomura Completes US $250 Million Floating Rate Note Issue for Malaysia’s 1st Silicon,
EDA TOOLS CAFÉ, June 15, 2001 (noting that the borrower is itself forty-eight percent owned by
an entity that is majority owned by the state of Sarawak), at http://www.dacafe.com/
DACafe/NEWS/ICNews/20010615_0002.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2002); see also Shah &
Roughton-Smith, supra note 28, at 2.
31. See generally Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) (discussing the signifi-
cance of capital structure in a perfect market).
32. Id. at 276.
33. Some scholars argue that transaction structures like secured debt and securitization do
not add value—that they simply constitute “grabs” from those who are not at the bargaining
table, unsecured creditors who did not provide in their agreements for the firm’s use of secured
debt, and tort and judgment creditors.  See, e.g., Lucien Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, The Uneasy
Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 934 (1996); Lynn Lo-
Pucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 15–16, 23 (1996).  A final observation: For those
who believe that creditors who are not “at the table” are being hurt by transaction structures
that give creditors who are at the table preferred treatment, a transaction structure like whole
business securitization exacerbates the problem.
34. This is a standard explanation given for secured debt.  A critique of this explanation,
and a more comprehensive explanation of secured debt is made in Claire A. Hill, Is Secured
Debt Efficient?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1117 (forthcoming May 2002).
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helps a firm separate assets that are less costly to appraise from the
remainder of the firm, thus confining costly inquiries about the firm’s
residual risk to a smaller group of assets.35  Another explanation I
have given is regulatory cost-reduction: using securitization, a firm
can obtain more favorable regulatory treatment.
Neither asset-segregation nor regulatory cost-reduction seems
like a promising explanation for whole business securitization.  Asset
segregation is clearly ruled out, since the assets are left together
rather than segregated.  An agency cost explanation doesn’t, at first
blush, seem promising either since whatever constraints are imposed
on the borrower through the structure could also be imposed through
a simpler and cheaper secured loan structure.
Indeed, whole business securitization seems particularly difficult
to explain.  It should be particularly expensive, not only because it is
in its infancy, but also because the differences in the assets and cash
flows means each transaction requires extensive and costly individual
tailoring.36  Moreover, the transaction necessarily contemplates care-
ful (that is, expensive) monitoring of the company, since the com-
pany’s continued performance in generating cash flows is critical.37
Two benefits that may be available are generic, applicable to
many different types of securitization.  One benefit may be a speciali-
zation benefit, as entities learn how to be the active trustees contem-
plated in these types of transactions.  Trustees learn how to monitor
and perform other relevant tasks cost-effectively for groups of inves-
tors.  Specialization in whole business securitization transactions may
not yet have progressed to the point that it yields an economy; how-
ever, parties hoping to promote a market in these types of transac-
tions might anticipate amortizing their costs over future transactions,
and hence might provide services in a particular transaction at prices
reflecting more experience with the type of transaction than they
have.
The other generic benefit is that securitization investors are capi-
tal markets investors, providing cheaper sources of financing than
banks.  The benefit to whole business securitization transactions
might be particularly large, since a firm doing such a transaction is
likely to obtain the bulk of its financing in that transaction.38  The
35. Hill, supra note 5, at 1066; see also id.
36. See Folkerts-Landau, supra note 22, at 1.
37. Id.
38. Certainly, a firm using whole business securitization is not able to get any more secured
debt, since the transaction secures all its assets.  And, given that the securitization is also of all
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larger a proportion of its financing a firm obtains on the capital mar-
kets, the more the firm has saved by its ability to access the capital
markets.
But what seems likelier as a source of benefit is the ex-ante inter-
creditor agreement among the investors, with its careful planning for
the firm’s bankruptcy.  Creditors take the possibility of a firm’s bank-
ruptcy into account in the terms on which they lend.  They multiply
the probability of bankruptcy by the expected cost of bankruptcy.  If
either of those numbers can be reduced, the creditors will offer the
firm better financing terms.
In the United States, bankruptcy is very costly.39  Because the law
does not allow any creditor to absolutely assure its position in the hi-
erarchy of creditors, an appreciable amount of expensive lawyer time,
as well as considerable energy of all parties concerned, is spent on the
negative-sum game of dividing (or establishing entitlement to) an
ever-dwindling set of assets.40  Secured creditors have de jure priority
and contractual seniority and subordination agreements may be re-
spected.  Still, both the rules and the conduct of the proceeding make
jockeying by all parties worthwhile.
By contrast, bankruptcy law in the United Kingdom and in coun-
tries which have based their bankruptcy law on U.K. law gives se-
cured creditors de facto as well as de jure priority.  Secured creditors
who have a security interest in all or substantially all of a bankrupt
firm’s assets (as the whole business securitization trustee does, on be-
half of the creditors) have the right to appoint an administrative re-
ceiver who runs the company for their benefit.41  An agreement
among the secured creditors is hence worthwhile because it divides
stable and determinate rights.  Moreover, since it is likely that the se-
cured creditors in a whole business securitization transaction com-
prise all the firm’s creditors (except perhaps for a few trade creditors)
the agreement effectively governs what will happen to the firm during
the firm’s present and future cash flows, it is hard to imagine from what sources other lenders
could hope to be repaid.
39. Older data suggests a figure for bankruptcy costs of 3.1% of the book value of debt plus
the market value of equity.  Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Vio-
lation of Priority Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 286 (1990).  It is difficult to know whether that
figure is accurate now.  But nobody doubts that the costs are significant.
40. This uncontroversial characterization stems from my own practice experience, and my
discussions with many bankruptcy practitioners.
41. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 32 (Eng.) (“Where application is made to the court to ap-
point a receiver on behalf of the debenture holders or other creditors of a company which is
being wound up by the court, the official receiver may be appointed.”).
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the bankruptcy; there need not be the costly squabbling before and
during bankruptcy that characterizes U.S. bankruptcy.  The incre-
ment of improvement achieved by the secured creditors may not be
very large, given their favorable position under the bankruptcy laws
in any event; however, to be worthwhile it only needs to exceed the
associated costs.
An objection to my explanation suggests itself: in emerging mar-
kets countries, enforcement of laws is sufficiently uncertain that in-
vestors can scarcely be assured that their intercreditor agreement will
be enforced.  I have three responses.  First, all that is needed is an in-
cremental benefit over the alternative.  The creditors do not need
complete assurance that their agreement will be upheld.  They only
need to think that the securitization transaction increases their ex-
pected recovery by more than the associated structuring costs.  Sec-
ond, to the extent that government guarantees are involved, the gov-
ernment may have a strong incentive to influence its own courts to
enforce the agreement.  The government of an emerging markets
country hoping to attract foreign investment might, in any event, have
such an incentive, even if it has not given a guarantee; a guarantee
might strengthen that incentive.42  Third, at this early stage, when
whole business securitization in emerging markets is in its infancy, the
creditors’ better terms—the terms that make the transaction struc-
turing expenditure worthwhile—may not be because of the value-
added of the intercreditor agreement.  Rather, the creditors may sim-
ply be relying on the government’s guarantee, a guarantee that the
government provides at a subsidized rate to attract more investment
to the region.  Once there is appreciable investment by capital mar-
kets investors, the payoff to predictable enforcement of bargains will
increase, which may in itself motivate such enforcement.
V.  CONCLUSION
Whole business securitization is potentially another arrow in a
firm’s quiver of financing options.  But how useful is it likely to be to
emerging markets firms?  At this early stage, when emerging markets
are only beginning to explore whole business securitization, most, if
not all, deals likely will involve a government guarantee of some sort.
On a pure economic basis, the transaction will not earn its keep.
42. The government guarantee may be available for less than the price of the credit en-
hancement that the guarantee provides, because the government can reduce the possibility that
the guarantee will have to be collected upon.
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Indeed, there are many reasons to suppose that whole business
securitization is no panacea for emerging markets firms.  The moder-
ate term aim is for the transaction structure to earn its keep without
the need for a guarantee.  The firms have to be good firms, capable of
servicing their debt.  Securitization in emerging markets firms has his-
torically sought to take high quality cash flows and segregate them
from the possibility of appropriation by a sovereign: the profile of se-
curitization uses has been “very good firm, bad government.”43  Here,
no segregation from the sovereign is possible, so the value of the
transaction cannot come from that source.44  Moreover, the “very
good firms” that typically use securitization in emerging markets
don’t need to be that good, because they’re not seeking to meet all
their financing needs through the securitization transaction structure.
They only need to have some good receivables that they can use to
obtain low-priced financing.45  By contrast, the firms in whole business
transactions aren’t just financing some of their good assets—they are
financing all their assets.  The set of firms that can sell interests in all
their assets on the capital markets is far smaller than those that simply
have some high-quality assets they can finance on the capital markets.
But an additional financing option surely cannot be bad, even if
it is rarely used.  Investment bankers thrive on innovation, and capital
markets are willing to exploit even the smallest increments of value-
added; if the Malaysian deal is successful, emerging markets should
begin to make more use of whole business securitization as well as
other innovative transaction structures.
43. Hill, supra note 8, at 318.
44. Note, however, that increasingly, securitization transactions in emerging markets have
contemplated more exposure to the sovereign, as more transactions involving domestic cash
flows and domestic investors have been completed.  See Sam Littlewood, Tomorrow’s Cash To-
day, CFO ASIA, Feb. 1999, at 70, 70–71 (surveying the use of asset backed securitization in
Asia), available at http://www.cfoasia.com/archives/9902-70.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
45. It is true, though, that those receivables are often future flows receivables, to be gener-
ated in the firm’s future operations, thus requiring that the firm has to stay good enough to gen-
erate those receivables.  See Hill, supra note 8, at 318–19.
